主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） -- 徐荣
家园 【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA
Winter of 1950-1951
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University
Chevy Chase, Maryland
（全文167页，节选翻译其中关于战术分析的部分章节，欲做进一步了解请通读原文）
作者：S. L. A. Marshall准将
翻译：徐荣、saverage、酸酸甜甜
特别感谢小隐在线上的网友：顾剑、离扬
因译者水平有限，错误之处在所难免，特将原文附于下方，请各位网友不吝赐教。
进攻中的中共军队
当描述敌人在这个国家开展的军事行动时，人们滥用了“人海战术”一词。新闻报道曾给人一种印象：中国人以极度密集的大量兵力发动进攻。某些官方文件也曾过于随意地用过这个词，因此就加深了人们的这样一种误解，即在我军各种武器火力笼罩下的敌军目标，正如“人海战术”一词所形容的那样，是个密集而又宽大从而有利于我方火力大量杀伤敌军的那样一种目标。曾有过这种性质的目标。例如，二月初中共军队进攻第23步兵团在砥平里的阵地时，以密集队形向前推进，在狭小区域内被大批地扫倒。
但这样的高兵力密度是例外。二战中红军在乌克兰战役对付德国人时，连续使用过以人海吸收并最终中和敌军火力，中国人集中兵力时并不是这样。更确切的说，中国人在接敌的最后阶段从纵队展开后，往往以多层细散兵线接近我们的工事，彼此间有相当的间隔。接敌纵队可能为一列宽，甚至为以4列纵队接敌的团级兵力，这取决于形势和攻击部队的规模。
地面状况的复杂情况也增加了我军火力集中捕捉敌军目标的困难，因为在各种复杂的地面状况下，敌军的进攻队形被自然的分散了，这就加大了我军火力集中一处而大量杀伤敌军的难度。山岭从来不是平直的，经常有突出部、裸岩、台地、细沟。结果，即使攻击队列行进速度一致，也没有哪种防御武器有杀伤任何大量敌人的清晰的射程。当敌人进入各种武器的反击火力射程之内，渐渐向阵地推近时，依然不会过分簇集。
在防御时，中共军队有效利用了地被植物，避免使用长的壕沟和密集队形，经常通过自身部署使我们的各种火力极少有大规模杀死他们的机会。主要战果是通过系统地使用合成火力取得的，没有哪一种或哪一类武器（迫击炮、大炮或轻武器）在实施决定性射击的过程中起主导作用。
CCF IN ATTACK
The word “mass” has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges, outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counterfire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire.
元宝推荐：海天,家园 好文好资料（美军的研究还真够细致的），长见识了。 象我这种不通洋文的人，最渴望见到如此妙笔了。
花献徐兄，期待见到你更多的大作。
家园 送花并鼓掌 不要小看这些鬼子们对过去战争的评价，对手想读懂我们，我们更要读懂对手。加油，徐兄
家园 徐兄加油！ 毕业后送您去英雄本色！ 家园 还得好好改改 还有不少错误得好好改改，先发出来供各位写文章的时候参考吧
家园 这个原文、翻译都不错，而且很有价值。虽然是在新兵营，但版主不妨加精！ 鼓励一下默默干活的新同学！
家园 真长，不过很好看，送花 家园 机枪 机枪
用法
由于朝鲜特殊的地形，使得我们在那里操作机枪的方式与常规以及教科书的规定大相径庭。
在防御的时候，机枪通常并不从两翼组成交叉火力，而是常常置于敌军的直接正面，从而对敌军最有可能的突破口进行直接的火力封锁和压制。一般情况下，那些利用山脊的高低起伏而建起的山头阵地，并不完全依赖机枪的保护。尽管有利的地形使我们的机枪在阵地上的作用变小了，但是当需要阻断一个在相当狭窄的扇形区域的敌军进攻时，通常还是机枪的作用大。有时候，机枪设置在与防线成直角的山梁和褶皱处，以这种方式他们的火力可以投射到任何径直闯进阵地的人身上。他们更频繁地布置在能以火力覆盖有利于敌人攀登的褶皱和斜坡的地方。在朝鲜很少遇到良好的机枪射界。
地形限制使这种武器失去了正常的战术效能和压制能力，而且消耗比迫击炮、勃朗宁轻机枪和步枪更大的弹药量。即使所有机枪操作状态良好，但单凭机枪火力不足以粉碎敌人的进攻，保障阵地安全。
中共军队主要以机枪火力为基础发扬战斗力，他们采用以下两种方式：（1）在防御时，将机枪配置在坚强的防御工事后方的掩体内；(2)在进攻时将机枪前出到尽可能靠近前沿的地方，尽管不可避免地要付出暴露目标的代价。
我方很少以这种方式使用机枪。
MACHINE GUNS
THEIR USE
The pattern of machine-gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else.
In defense, the gun is most frequently used to block the more likely avenues of approach; its fire is directed straight ahead instead of from flankward across the front.The average hilltop position, by reason of elevation and the unevenness of the ridge crust, does not lend itself to over-all protection by machine guns. They do their bit, but usually they are set to traverse over a relatively narrow sector of the perimeter.
Occasionally, as the ground and situation permit, the guns are set up on a nose or fold in the ridge running at right angles to the defending line, in such a way that their fire will take in flank any body moving directly into the position. More frequently they are disposed in such a way as to cover the main draws or the slope which looks most favorable to ascent by the enemy. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met with in Korea.
This limiting factor in the terrain deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load of work on the mortars, the BARS, and the riflemen.Even though all guns remain in operation, machine-gun fire alone is never enough to break up enemy attack and give security to the position.
The CCF develop their fighting power largely around a base of machine-gun fire by (1) bunkering the guns behind heavily resistant works when on defense, and (2) advancing the guns well to the fore in the attack, despite the entailed exposure.
Our guns are seldom employed in this manner.
进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。
这些机枪操作方式上的一般差异，并不能确切反映出双方使用效率的高低，或是反映了在机枪技术发展方面的出现了某种空白。更准确的说，那些差异和技术空白直接源自交战双方所采用的战术手段的不同，而关键在于机枪只是整个火力体系中的一部分。
In the attack our man-handled machine guns are not ordinarily pressed far to the fore but are more likely to be used to provide a semi-covering fire from whatever ground will provide them reasonably good protection. Even so, we lose a high percentage of machine guns to enemy fire.
On defense, the gun is usually fought in the open and is seldom given better than superficial protection - such as an earth bank or a rude parapet of loose rock.We maneuver more than CCF; changes in position are most frequent. There is rarely time to provide the gun with a protected siting. Our own attack is likely to wear along until late afternoon; the guns must be ready to fire by dark from the new defensive position.
These general differences in operating method do not accurately reflect relative efficiency, or lack thereof, in the development of machine-gun technique. Rather, they arise from the fact that the two sides are employing two greatly differing tactical methods, in which emphasis on the machine gun is only part of the over-all fire equation.
中共军队的行动是以单一的火力手段为特色的，这种单一的火力手段完全以机枪为中心，围绕机枪的效用，将机枪的作用发挥到极至。而之所以可以这么做，其中一个重要因素是中共军队具有足可消耗的人力。中共军队中的重机枪组成员总是能够忠于职守，最后一个撤退，因此就使他的机枪发挥了更大的作用（当然，这种做法是要冒着被歼灭的风险的）。
而在我军的行动则发展出多元性的火力使用特点——比其他军队中发展出更多的特点。因为有多种可以选择的武器系统，机枪的使用并不十分重要。我们现在习惯认为机枪的使用就意味着广泛和良好的火力带。不过在朝鲜，这种情况比较少见。偶尔，时机合适，机枪也能够发挥在较大距离中充分发挥作用。不过，当战斗到关键时刻，这个优势距离会被前沿的缩短迅速打破。此时，步枪和勃朗宁轻机枪在300码以下的范围内就发挥了更大的杀伤效能。
中共军队使用机枪的有效距离是30到500码。进攻中，如果需要前沿火力压制，他们可以尽可能的使机枪伴随步枪和半自动步枪。并且在白天的就地防御中，如果他们能够得到较好掩护前沿，他们有时就会把机枪阵地设在步枪线前面。
他们的远距离射击缺乏准头，我们的重机枪则能很正常地射击，相比之下，他们在极短距离内对这种武器鲁莽而有效的使用则威胁较大。只有在极少数的情况下中共军队才会在500码的距离上使用机枪。当他们试图延长射程，也就是说加上200码，我们的部队就会毫不犹豫的开火，并且忽视他的存在。这通常是正确的，大群的步兵或者一个车队通常是一个相当合适的目标。根据教科书，重机枪在中等距离是相当精确的阻止武器。可根据我军在冬季战役中的经验，这并不是一个好方法。有大量战例记录显示，在几个小时的战斗中，2到3挺敌人机枪在600到700码距离上打击一个有限目标，取得的效果非常差。所有的参战条件都表明在火力范围超过500到650码这个范围，杀伤效率更多的依靠人眼所能看到的而不是机枪所能做到的。
CCF operations are characterized by simplicity of fire means, centering around maximum use of the machine gun. The expendability of this force’s human material is one of the enabling factors toward this end. When Chinese MG crews can be committed repeatedly to situations permitting no escape, the weapon ipso facto is given a chance to score heavily prior to liquidation.
Our operations develop around multiplicity of fire means - an evolution more marked in our Army than in any other. The effects of the gun are less decisive simply because of the existence of so many complementary weapons. We habitually think of machine-gun usage in connection with expansive and favorable fields of fire. In Korea these are generally lacking. There are some occasions when the gun is useful at the longer ranges for relatively brief periods. But in the crises of action, the preponderant portion of its fire almost invariably is directed against the immediate foreground. As with the rifle and the BAR, its killing effects for the most part are achieved at ranges under 300 yards.
The CCF employ the machine gun effectively at ranges running between 30 and 500 yards. In the attack, when there is suitable cover in the foreground, they will get in as close with their machine guns as with rifles and sub-machine guns, and in local counter-attacks during daylight, if they are advantaged by a thicket or brush-covered salient, they will sometimes run the machine gun out as a point beyond the rifle line.
Their reckless and effective use of the weapon at extreme short ranges, however, is less instructive than what their gunnery appears to lack over distances which we have always considered quite normal for the HMG. It is only in the exceptional tactical circumstance that CCF employ the machine gun successfully against our infantry at 500 yards range. When they attempt to engage with the gun at ranges longer than that, say adding another 200 yards to the distance, our troops are relatively unsusceptible to the fire and pay it little heed. That holds generally true even when the fire is delivered broadside against a body of infantry (or a column of vehicles) offering a fairly substantial target. According to the book, the HMG should be an accurate stopping weapon at these intermediate ranges. Insofar as the general experience of our own line during the winter campaign sheds light on this subject, it does not work out in practice. There are numerous examples in the record of engagements wherein two or three enemy guns, firing from 600-700 yards distance against one limited target area, failed to bear effectively during several hours of fighting. All of the attendant circumstances appeared to indicate that when fires are exchanged at ranges in excess of somewhere between 550 and 650 yards, the rate of effectiveness is less dependent on what the gun can do than on what the human eye can see.
他们对机枪的使用最为持久稳定。有保养机枪和在任何天气情况下操作的诀窍。他们的火力在较短距离内十分精确。最大限度的使用火力掩护部队插入而不是浪费大量子弹去扫射地面。通过这些很基本的技术，他们取得了巨大的战果。机枪作为他们的进攻的支点表现出色。
一般情况下，如果和我们携带的其他步兵武器，即7.62毫米通用口径武器族的使用效果相比，在朝鲜的战斗中，我们机枪火力所发挥的影响力似乎逊于以往的那支现代化美军中所使用的机枪火力。距离有限，使机枪不能发挥防御点和在交火中阻止敌人进攻的关键作用。怎么会这样？很难解释，因为步兵连队里的搬运工们过去从来也没有抱怨过轻机枪是个特别沉重累赘的东西。枪不是特别重，机枪手们不会掉队。曾经有过部队扛着机枪径直向敌人阵地冲锋的事例。但是一般情况下机枪却做不到根据战术形势变化而机动部署。这可能真的是出於我们多种武器系统里面天生的惰性吧：武器多了，其战术效果就是加进一种新的兵器，导致其他所有兵器的相对机动性就下降。
在朝鲜的机枪使用，特别是在我们的进攻中，上述这种情况似乎出现的相当普遍，尽管普通勃朗宁轻机枪手的灵活性和显著的积极性提供了反例。
Their use of machine guns is most persistent. They have the knack of keeping their guns fed and operating under any weather conditions. Their fire is accurate at the short distances. They make maximum use of grazing fire, with the object of keeping troops inert, rather than wasting an excess of bullets by shooting into the dirt embankments. Out of these rather elementary techniques, they achieve large effects. The gun is pretty much the pivot of their attack.
In general, the impact of our own machine-gun fire upon the local situation in the Korean fighting, when considered in relation to the effects of other weapons carried by the infantry (this refers to the .30 fire), would seem to be somewhat less than in past performances by modern American forces. The instances are few indeed in which the operation of the machine guns appears to be the decisive factor in retaining a position, or in depressing the counterfire which is deterring the attack. Why this is so becomes difficult to evaluate, since the LMG is almost never mentioned among the overburdening items in the company load by the load carriers. The weight of the gun is not prohibitive; the gunners do not straggle. There are instances in the record where it was carried by troops directly charging the enemy position. But the average employment of the gun is not mobile in respect to local changes in the tactical situation. This may well be the consequence of an inertia inherent in our multiple weapons system: is it not within reason that one of the tactical effects of weapons multiplication is that the addition of each new weapon tends to lower the relative local mobility of every other weapon?
The employment of machine guns in Korea, particularly by our attack, would seem to call for exploration of the question, though the phenomenal enterprise and mobility of the average BAR carrier is evidence to the contrary.
- 复 机枪
家园 步枪 步枪
老伙计
在朝鲜的战斗中，步枪兵（包括装备卡宾枪的士兵）参与积极射击的比例明显要高于二战中的军事行动。
人们能察觉这一点但无法进行精确地计算，因此很难以精确的百分率表示这个增长。然而，根据调查所涉及的昼间和夜间军事行动的平均状况，研究人员认为无论敌人使用哪种武器，超过50%的部队都能够在交火时坚守阵地。
在朝鲜的军事行动中，手榴弹往往是初上战场的新兵的首选。然而，根据观察，一条几乎不变的法则再次得到验证：一旦我军士兵开始使用某种武器打击敌军士兵，他就会一直用下去，后来他就会积极主动地使用这种他擅长的火器。在朝鲜的昼间进攻中，部队经常以很窄的正面前进。因为山岭的棱线上缺少活动空间，所以连队以纵深队形行进。由于队列本身的限制，让所有人都毫无阻碍的使用手中的武器是不可能的。在某连中只有两三个班或许还有同等数量的重武器，能够进入阻止敌军进攻、控制战场的关键阵地。地形本身就减少了积极使用武器的人数，除非让各班轮流进入和撤出前沿阵地。
此外，向可从正面进攻的较低的小山岭突击时，步兵在登上山顶后通常立即靠拢，与他们随身携带武器的微弱火力相比，攀登中的士兵更需要火炮、坦克、多用途战车、迫击炮的弹幕射击把敌人赶下山去。在这种行动中，步兵很少实施行进间射击。在一般情形，这种射击打不中任何目标，因为在到达军事棱线前山坡的突出部会干扰交战双方的射击，它也从来没有牵制住敌人。当散兵线看到某个像目标的东西时都会停下来射击。但在这种行动中，步枪的用处不大，反之，手榴弹却可以大显身手。
THE RIFLE
THE OLD STANDBY
In the Korean fighting, there is manifestly a higher percentage of active fire participation by riflemen (including those armed with the carbine) than in operations during World War II.
This can be felt, rather than accurately counted, and therefore it is difficult to arrive at an accurate percentage figure indicative of the increase. However, averaging out the night and day operations which were covered in the survey, it is considered that well in excess of 50 percent of troops actually committed to ground where fire may be exchanged directly with the enemy will make use of one weapon or another in the course of an engagement.
The pattern of Korean operations is such that the hand grenade is frequently the first weapon employed by the novice in combat. But again it is observed as an almost invariable rule that once the individual uses any weapon against enemy personnel, he will go on then to become in future engagements relatively a self-starter with his personal firearm. In the daylight attack in Korea, troops frequently advance with an extremely narrow front, the company going forward in depth because of the lack of space for deployment in the movement along the ridge crest. This cramping of the formation by its nature often makes it impossible for all hands to use their weapons freely. Of a given company, only two or three squads, and perhaps the same number of heavy weapons, may be able to take position where they can bear against the enemy-held ground. In such instances, the terrain itself reduces the number who participate actively with weapons, except as squads are rotated in and out of the forward positions.
Again, in the assault upon the lower sub-ridges, which can be attacked frontally, the foot force is likely to close as rapidly as it can toil uphill, with the climbing men depending more upon the barrage fires of the artillery, armor, multiple mounts, and mortars to beat the enemy down than upon the relatively feeble power of their hand-carried weapons. In this type of action, marching fire is rarely given effective use by the infantry. In the average situation, it would serve no object, since the bulge of the hillside intervenes between the two forces until the military crest is reached, and the fire would not even serve to keep the enemy pinned. The rifle line will halt and fire when it sees anything resembling a target. But in this type of action, there is likely to be small practical use for the rifle, whereas the grenade may prove very handy.
夜间防御提供了证明M1加兰德步枪火力的最佳机会。是否能够在短时间内大规模发扬M1步枪的火力首先取决于识别目标的距离。如果敌军在我方开火前抵近并在交战的第一阶段出现双方互掷手榴弹的局面，那么即使防线位于高地、袭来的手榴弹威力不大，也不利于发扬步枪火力。对我方火力组遭受敌军投弹手的近距离压制的战斗的研究表明上述规律几乎无一例外出现在这些战斗中。在防御的第一阶段大量使用手榴弹抑制了其它或许是更有用的防御火力的使用。士兵们并不乐意从手榴弹换用步枪并在急需应对敌人的行动时又换回手榴弹。稳定的步枪战斗通常等到手榴弹互掷到了尾声才开始。在近战防御中，在使用双人散兵坑的场合，在同时需要手榴弹和子弹火力的情形，完全可以通过指定一人为专职投弹手、另一人为专职射手的办法建立有效的步枪火力。在三人或四人火力组中，一人应以投弹为主要任务。留意一下二战时的术语吧，他应该被叫做这个组的“爆破手”。
当敌人的进攻被阻止在自动武器能首先与之交战的射程之内时，它们的火力将会使步枪防线明显活跃起来，对M1步枪和卡宾枪的全面使用将持续到战斗终止。关于步枪的射击量，应当再次指出这与不同形式下的战术变化所造成的阵地战和运动战间的比率有直接关系。至于在步枪防线中的叫喊和欢呼，这是稳定的射击的结果，每个士兵都从中受益，叫喊和欢呼激发他的判断力，使他更加活跃，努力寻找最有效的开火位置。所有对夜战的研究的结论是：开火最激烈的部队会根据形势变化做出最迅速使用的战术调整，不给敌人喘息的机会。
The night engagement on defense provides the most favorable opportunity for Ml fire. Whether it can be developed quickly in considerable volume depends primarily on the distance at which recognition takes place. If the enemy gets in close before firing starts and the initial phase sees the two sides engage in a heavy exchange of hand grenades, the rifle firing is apt to develop raggedly, even though the defending line is on higher ground and the incoming grenades are doing little damage. The study of actions in which our firing groups are closely pressed by enemy grenadiers shows almost no exception to this. Heavy use of grenades in the first stage of defense tends toward the repression of other, and perhaps more useful, fires by the defense. Men do not shift readily from the grenade to the rifle and back again as enemy movement might seem to require. Steady rifle action will usually await the dying-away of the grenade exchange. In close defense, where the two-man foxhole system is used, it could conceivably build up the effectiveness of infantry fire as a whole to designate one man primarily as thrower and the other as firer, in any situation which calls for both grenade and bullet fire. Out of a three-man or four-man fire team, one man should be encharged with the main duty of grenading. To advert to World War I terminology, he should be the “bomber” of the team.
When the enemy in the attack is intercepted at such range that the automatic weapons can first engage him, their fire is highly stimulating to the rifle line, and general use of the Ml and carbine (provided the ammunition holds) is likely to persist until the action is concluded. In connection with rifle fire volume, again it should be noted that there is a direct relationship between the rate of buildup and mobile response to the tactical changes in situation. As with shouting and cheering along the rifle line, there is something about steady fire production, and participation therein by the individual, which enlivens his senses and makes him move about more, in the endeavor to see where the fire would be most useful. The entire study of night actions is conclusive to this end: the unit which engages strongly with fire will also make the most rapid and practical adjustment to the changes in situation and will leave the fewest openings to the enemy.
从十一月到次年三月的朝鲜战事中，实际上很少有部队（即使是排级兵力）在身体上被中共军队的进攻压垮。总的来说，我军步兵坚守阵地直至打光大多数武器的弹药；随后士兵们尽可能向后方阵地撤退。他们并未屈服于逃跑的欲望，那些幸存者是以相当良好的秩序撤退的。只有极少的战例中我军防线未进行强烈抵抗就被撕碎，这是因为散兵坑中的士兵遭遇了迅速的奇袭，当敌军在他们周围25至30码距离内开火才收到警报，他们“感觉被压得抬不起头来，无法射击”，由于缺少火力保护，阵地陷落了。
但是在我军更多的战例中，尽管一开始面临同样严重的不利局势，士兵们仍然保持信心并用M1步枪开火，因而成功守住了阵地。只要实施坚决的指挥，大声下达命令，无论离敌军多近士兵们都会作出反应。但如果当士兵们遭受猛烈奇袭的打击时，把他们丢给自己的装备任其自生自灭，那么他们就会无所作为，或者软弱无力地试图用手榴弹阻击敌军。报告中有一些关于这种差别的非常令人吃惊的战例。
In Korean operations from November to March, there were relatively few examples of units - even of platoon strength - being actually physically “overrun” by the CCF attack. Generally, our infantry stood its ground and fought until most of the weapons ran dry; the men then withdrew as best they could to positions farther back. They did not yield to the desire for flight; they went back in reasonably good order - those who survived. But in the rare cases in which the line was cracked apart without giving a strong account of itself, it was because the men in the foxholes were taken by swift surprise, getting their first warning as fire broke around them from 25 to 30 yards range. They “felt that they could not get their heads up to fire”; for lack of fire, the position fell.
But there were just as many more case studies in which our troops, taken initially at this same heavy disadvantage, still rallied and opened fire with their Mls and thereafter managed to hold the position. When strong direction was given, and commands were shouted, the men responded, no matter how close the enemy. But when they were left to their own devices, under the shock of dramatic surprise, they either did nothing or made feeble attempts to grenade the enemy to a halt. The record provides some very startling examples of this difference.
我军再次吸取了这个教训：即使近距离冲锋中的敌人也能被子弹火力阻止住，尽管他只要在运动中手榴弹就可能起不了多大作用。敌人的队伍退下去以后，可以把手榴弹滚下山或者直接扔向他的队列，那是一种完全不同的情形。但在近距离战斗中，手榴弹和子弹的合成火力依然比单独使用其中一种更为有效。
因为新兵在夜战中经常胡乱开枪，在战后总结里，就算特别注意细节，也不可能说出每个人使用武器的情况，甚至不可能了解谁积极参战了。那些检查武器和个人弹药供给之类事物的下级军官也不可能彻底搞清楚这个问题。在紧张的夜战造成的混乱中，有相当数量的人错拿了别人的武器；此外，下级军官也不可能总是在黑暗中检查是否每个士兵都发挥了积极作用。因此，关于个人行为的数据并非总是能够获取并加以证实的，必须认识到这一点：某些参战者阵亡或失踪了，所有的目击者都受到震动，他们提供的情报无论如何都会有相当大的误差。
然而，通过战后回溯战斗发生时的各个事件，加上点数士兵谁在战斗中使用了武器和谁积极参战，综合起来看，可以得出以下合理的估计：
在朝鲜，一个普通步兵连中有12%——20%的人员不但积极参与射击，而且还程度不同的主动在关键岗位上发挥领导作用，同时也从事了改善阵地形势、增加凝聚力的个人活动。
除了这支关键性力量，还有大约25%——35%的人员也不同程度地参与了整个射击行动，但并没有发挥出对战斗过程的标志性影响。
The lesson is again drawn that a charging enemy, even at close range, can be stopped by bullet fire, though the grenade is not likely to avail as long as he is in motion. After his line has gone down, and grenades can be rolled downhill or thrown against his line, that is a quite different situation. But in short range action, combining grenade and bullet fire is still more effective than either weapon used separately.
Because of the high incidence of panic firing among the unseasoned men during night defense, it was not possible in the Korean critiques, even when full attention was given to detail, to determine the total circumstances in which each man used his weapon, or even to be sure that he had been an active firer. That could not be finally ascertained even by those junior leaders who made a check of weapons and personal ammunition supply following engagement. There is considerable weapons-switching in the confusions of a strenuous night engagement; moreover, junior leaders cannot always determine, in the darkness whether each of their men is taking an aggressive part. Hence the data on personal action is not always obtainable and verifiable, and it must be recognized that, when some of the actors are dead or missing, and all of the witnesses have been shaken, there is a considerable margin of error which may apply either way.
However, from synthesizing incidents around which the fighting developed, and from the post-critique showing of hands on the questions of which men had used weapons in addition to those who had played a prominent part in the engagement, this estimate is supportable :
In the average infantry company in Korea, between 12 and 20 percent of the
men not only participate actively in the firing, but exercise varying degrees of initiative in on-the-spot leading and taking personal action of a type that betters the unit position and induces cohesion. .
In addition to this control force, there are between 25 and 35 percent of the men who take some part in the fire action, with varying degrees of consistency, but without otherwise giving marked impulse to the course of events.
研究人员认为这种表现说明我军比起二战时的平均水平有了扎实的进步。
在二战中，很容易遇到做出“我看见了敌人；我没有开火；我不知道为什么”这种回答的士兵。在朝鲜战场，这种回答奇怪地消失了。实际上，在战后总结中没有一个未开火的士兵做出这样的解释。
未开火的士兵给出的理由可能会是这些：
“我一直看不见敌军目标，我认为最好还是不开火。”
“手榴弹劈头盖脸地砸来，我抬不起头。”
“我面前有一座小土山，敌军隐藏在它后面，我看不见。”
“我还没看见任何人向我冲过来，就从背后被俘了。”
“机枪卡壳了，我在帮军士修理机枪。”
“敌军人数太多，我希望他们可能没注意到我，就没开火。”
“我的枪冻住了，又找不着别的枪。”
诸如此类。所有的解释在他们所处的形势下都是可以说的通的。但与二战时的经验相比，没有一种回答显示士兵的双手为某种根深蒂固的习惯所束缚。
从统计学的意义上说，没有出现那种回答的意义可能并不像表面看上去那么重要。我们甚至可以认为在一个普通连队中总有那么一些人串通好了掩盖真相。但这些答复强烈暗示，“参与射击是一种光荣的义务”的想法开始在步兵队伍中扎根，每个士兵都感觉到自己身负义务。
It is believed that this showing is a substantial improvement over the participation averages among World War II troops.
The infantry soldier, so commonly met with in World War II, who made the stock answer: “I saw the enemy; I didn’t fire; I don’t know why,” is strangely missing from the Korean scene. In fact, this reply was not returned by a single man among the non-firers at any critique.
Among the reasons given by the non-firers would be these:
“I didn’t see an enemy target at any time and I thought it best to hold fire until I did.”
“Grenades were coming in at such a rate I couldn’t get my head up.”
“There was a rise of earth in front of me which hid their people to view.”
“I was captured from behind before I saw anyone come against me.”
“I was helping the sergeant get the machine gun back into operation.”
“There were so many of them that I held fire, thinking they might pass us by.”
“My gun was frozen and I couldn’t find another.”
And so on. All of these explanations made sense in the situation. But in contrast to World War II experience, there were no answers returned indicating that the soldier’s hand was held by some deep-rooted inhibition.
Statistically, the absence of such answers may not be as important as it appears on the surface. We may even take it that there are a few such men in the average company, and that they are covering up. But there is a strong implication that the idea has become ingrained in the infantry line that fire participation is an obligation of honor, and the obligation is felt by the average soldier.
狙击
狙击战术在美军中应用最少。军官们一般都同意，战场上经常需要派神枪手在前哨阵地独立潜伏，等候打中目标的机会。敌军有时采用这种战术。我军从未系统化地应用狙击战术，通常只是一两人的即兴发挥而已。究竟是我军战术教学和训练中存在着某种局限，还是今日普通美国年轻人的天性中存在着某种自我克制，这真的很难说清楚。
第八集团军缺乏狙击所需的器材，特别是夜间执行任务必备的红外瞄准镜。在冬季战役中，部队配备的数量极少，充其量不过是团部人员新奇的消遣而已。步兵指挥官们表示如果他们能获得大量的器材则将会对夜间防御大有裨益。不过很难在单兵行动中发现任何数据支持这一评估。
在侧翼设置的前哨和警戒哨更依靠自动火力而不是一些专业人员用步枪操作的精密作业。当阵地面临的压力不断增强并开始收缩时，步兵更愿意撤退到能为机枪和勃朗宁轻机枪火力掩护的场所而非自动火力不能保护的邻近地区。尽管装备M1步枪的士兵的开火次数普遍增加，但未受重武器协助的步兵在稳定防御阵地中却很少起关键作用。
发挥个人主动性的突出战例主要是巴祖卡火箭筒射手，勃朗宁轻机枪手和机枪手创造的。当敌军在距我军防线75到200码的距离设置机枪并冒着火力将它前送的时候，在大多数情况下它将被有进取心的重武器射手而不是两三个移动中的敢做敢为的步兵歼灭。
在记录中发现的例外如此之少实在令人诧异，尽管你可能会猜想这是缺乏对狙击战术持续的教导所造成的。装备步枪的士兵在使用其单兵武器时很少表现出主动性，除非占领无论何时都能带给自己新的有利条件以应对敌军人员在开阔地上的移动的前沿阵地。个人灵活性加上枪法，再加上伪装的天赋，就构成了“狙击”行动的基础。
由于我军普遍缺少这样的行动基础（“狙击”行动的基础），同时，我军的步兵行动总是围绕或借助于战线中的某种重武器或者是别的什么优先前提而展开，因此也就从根本上减少了把所有火力作为一个整体沿防御正面平均分布的机会。这也是一个给每个步兵连配发双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的间接依据，因为从效用对比上看，双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的火力效果要好于双倍的M1步枪和卡宾枪的有效火力
SNIPING
There is minimal use of sniper tactics among American forces. Leaders are in general agreement that the situation would often lend itself to exploitation by individual sharpshooters working stealthily into the forward ground, taking independent cover, and there awaiting any target of opportunity. The enemy occasionally employs such tactics. It is never systematically done by our side, and such actual sniper tactics as are employed are usually an improvization of the moment by one or two individuals. Whether the limiting factor is the rigidity in our tactical teaching and training or some inhibition in the nature of today’s average young American would be hard to say.
The Eighth Army is short on special equipment for the sniper, particularly the infrared scope needed for night work. During winter operations these were present in such limited numbers as to be hardly more than a novelty for the amusement of the command at a regimental headquarters.
Infantry line commanders frequently expressed the view that if they could get the equipment in quantity, it would be a godsend in night defense. But it was impossible to find any data on individual usage in amplification of this estimate.
Outposts and outguards posted along the flank tend to rely more on automatic firepower than on precision work by a few marksmen with the rifle. When the position comes under an increasing pressure and begins to contract, riflemen incline to fall back toward the ground covered by the machine guns and BARS rather than to deploy toward the adjacent spaces which the automatic fire cannot protect. Despite a general increase of firing by those who are armed with the Ml, it is rare indeed that a knot of riflemen, unaided by one of the heavier weapons, plays a pivotal part in the stabilizing of the defensive position.
The examples of great individual initiative are generally provided by a bazooka man, a BAR carrier, or a machine gunner. When, for example, an enemy machine gun sets up somewhere within 75 to 200 yards of the defending line, and brings it under punishing fire, it will be eliminated in most cases by the enterprise of a firer with one of the heavier weapons, rather than by the mobile aggressiveness of two or three riflemen.
It is really astonishing how few exceptions to this are to be found in the record, though one suspects that it is by nature the case, in the absence of persistent indoctrination in sniper tactics. The rifle-armed individual can hardly express initiative in the employment of his personal weapon except by taking up forward ground whenever so doing gives him fresh advantage against enemy personnel moving in the open. This individual mobility, plus marksmanship, plus a talent for concealment, is the essence of “sniper” action.
Our general lack of it, and the tendency in our infantry to move with, and around, one of the heavier weapons in the line, or else forego all movement, materially reduces the chance that fire as a whole will be evenly distributed along the length of the defended front. This is a collateral argument for doubling the number of BARS per infantry company. In ratio, it might very well have the effect of doubling the useful fire from the Ml and carbine.
战术奇袭的缺乏
既然我军步兵中缺乏真正的狙击战术是因为我军的军事学说更强调团队精神，而不是因为美国人性格中有什么消极因素，产生另一项战术局限性的原因也应该在这方面仔细加以考察，尽管这与步枪并没有直接关系。
处于敌军压力之下的美军连队在夜间进行环形防御的时候，从未对敌军暴露的侧翼发动突然的反突击，甚至在局势完全有利于采取这项行动时也未能有所作为。这支连队会尽可能坚守阵地，如果全面压力变得难以承受，它将向中央或最强的侧翼收缩防线。如果出现夺取和利用主阵地线内的更有利战场的机会，这支部队的一些人通常能抓住。一旦敌人没注意到与主阵地毗邻的山岭的褶皱和缓坡，而从那里自动火力可用来打击敌人的侧翼，那么我军士兵将利用这种地形。
但是几乎所有的重要活动看上去都受到“如果不彼此靠拢也要保持不间断的联系”这一原则的限制
LACK OF TACTICAL SURPRISE
Since the lack of true sniper tactics in our infantry force appears to stem from doctrinal emphasis on the importance of unity within the group, rather than from negative characteristics in the American individual, one other of the constricting effects upon tactics might well be examined at this point, though it is not directly related to the use of the rifle.
The American company under pressure, during nighttime defense of a perimeter,is never inclined to throw a surprise counterpressure against the open flank of the enemy, even when the situation appears wholly favorable to such a design. It holds ground, if possible. It contracts toward the center or toward the strongest flank if the general pressure becomes uncontainable. If an opportunity affords to seize and use more advantageous ground within the outline of the general position, some part of the force will usually grasp it. Should the enemy overlook a fold or attenuation of the ridge, in juxtaposition to the main position, from which automatic fire can be turned against the enemy flank, weapons men will take advantage of it.
But practically all main movement appears to be circumscribed by the principle that all forces should remain continuously in juncture, if not contracting toward each other.
我军从未使用过这样的奇袭战术，即从主力部队中暂时抽调小股部队去执行挫伤敌军锐气、分散敌军注意力的任务。
设想一下这种局面：一个连队的兵力在岭脊上均匀地展开。敌军的攻势在正面和右翼发展迅速，看来这支队伍是输是赢完全取决于那个地段的态势。
左翼仍几乎未参战。虽然看不见任何目标，但这个扇区内的机枪一直在掩护前方的斜坡，步兵呆在散兵坑中，等待什么时候能帮得上忙。60mm迫击炮埋伏在山后，但是敌军已经从邻近我军散兵坑的右翼逼近…，这些迫击炮的火力已不能成为决定性的威慑力量。
看来这些迫击炮和所有未交火地带的武器都没有迅速地转移到远离敌人进攻路线的场所，并从他背后投射炽烈火力。机枪、轻机枪或除去底盘的轻迫击炮都能可靠地完成这种打了就跑的任务。他们本应在短时间内发挥奇袭作用，坚持到足以让对手动摇（就撤退），迫使他（从我军正面）调走部分兵力。
当炮火遮断整个战区的时候，缺乏这样的进取心还容易解释，但一项重要的事实是即使步兵独立作战它也从来没有尝试过实施奇袭，而只将生还的希望寄托在自身的武器和人力上。
局部奇袭在心理上的价值几乎与主力奇袭一样重要。然而，没有记录证明我军曾有系统地利用了这些战术手段。在这方面，正如缺乏真正的狙击战术一样，我军小部队行动的粗糙质量终将给敌军以可乘之机。敌军在与我军小股部队交战中，几乎可以指望自己不上当。
在大规模军事行动中，我军最大限度地使用了奇袭和欺骗，例如利用装甲纵队突围。为什么在我军的小部队战术教学中很少采用同样的原则呢？这个问题值得仔细考虑。在我们研究的所有在朝鲜的军事行动中，竟没有一个美国连队使用牵制火力的战例。然而，在许多战例中我们的中国敌人成功地以这种方式拓展了武器用途。
There are no surprise tactics in which some fraction of the force detaches itself temporarily from the main body with the object of creating a demoralizing diversion.
Take this situation : The Company is deployed along a ridge top with its strength distributed quite evenly. The enemy attack develops strongly against the front and right flank, and the whole appearance of the situation is that the line will win or lose according to what happens in that quarter.
The left flank remains practically unengaged. The machine gun in that sector continues to cover a forward slope, though seeing no targets, and the riflemen stay in their foxholes, awaiting the time when they can be useful. The 60-mm mortars are behind the hill in a draw, but because the enemy has closed in right next to the friendly foxholes, their fire is not a decisive deterrent.
It seems never to happen that any of these weapons from the quiet zone, or the mortar battery, will be moved out quickly into ground off the enemy avenue of approach with the object of throwing a shock fire across his rear. Such hit-and-run missions conceivably could be done either with machine guns, BARS, or light mortars minus base plates. They would be transitory by nature, done for surprise effect, and sustained just long enough to unsettle the opponent and make him divert some part of his force.
When artillery is interdicting the general area, the lack of such enterprises as these is subject to explanation, But the significant fact is that it seems never to be attempted even in situations where infantry is operating on its own, and its hope for survival depends upon what can be achieved with its own weapons and manpower.
The moral values in local surprise should be relatively as great as in major surprise. But it is not of record that we attempt systematically to explore them. In this, as in the lack of true sniper tactics, our small-unit operations have a gregarious quality which ultimately must provide some comfort to the enemy. In his grapple with the small unit he can pretty well count on not being bluffed.
In the larger scale of operations, we employ surprise and bluff to a maximum; for example, in the sorties made by armored columns. The reason why we are loath to work by the same principle in our small-group teaching should be well worth searching consideration. In all the operations brought under study in Korea, there is not one example of an American company attempting to use diversionary fire. However, there are numerous examples of the Chinese enemy successfully exploiting his use of weapons in this manner.
