主题：【译】中国军队对猛烈炮击的战术反应 -- 徐荣

美 指挥与参谋学院战斗研究所 报告 第13号

对集中使用炮兵的战术反应

第7章

Gary J. Bjorge博士 著

朝鲜战争：中国军队对猛烈炮击的战术反应

被派到朝鲜的中国军队主要由轻型步兵师组成，他们没有空军、没有坦克，只有少量轻型火炮可供火力支援。他们对面的联合国军则享有前线的制空权和优势巨大的炮兵火力。在1951年上半年，联合国军利用空中力量和炮兵造成了中共军队的严重伤亡，并迫使中共军队发展出特殊的防御措施。首先，进攻行动的规模被缩减；其次，中共军队努力减少易受火力打击的目标数目，尽可能地将部队藏于地下。这些努力相当成功，足以使中共军队保持在朝鲜半岛实现战役和战略僵局所需的战斗力。

1951年4月和5月

在1951年4月和5月中共军队的攻势中发生的情况具体说明了炮击和轰炸对中共军队的机动部队的破坏性效果。中共军队在汉城以北针对美第1军发动的4月攻势把联合国军的防线推回汉城北郊，但由于联合国军空军和炮兵所造成的巨大伤亡和组织混乱，这场攻势大势已去。联合国军的轰炸机和远程炮兵对中共军队的后方遮断导致了中国人后勤系统的崩溃和各部队间通信的中断。随着混乱愈演愈烈，中共军队的指挥官们只能发出“能向南走多远就走多远”之类笼统的命令。（中共军队的）预备队不了解已遭受的伤亡和出现的混乱状态，就超越前方部队直接参战。[1]当这场攻势在9天后结束时，据一项估计，有71，712名中国和北朝鲜士兵阵亡。[2]

（本章节作者引用数字有问题，《朝鲜战争中的美国陆军—潮涨潮落》437页给出的数据为估计第1军作战地段内志愿军和人民军的总伤亡为71,712人，该书也承认这些估计都不确切

Among a variety of estimates, an Eighth Army headquarters report for the eight-day period from evening of the 22d to evening of the 30th listed 13,349 known enemy dead, 23,829 estimated enemy dead, and 246 taken captive. This report included information obtained daily from U.S. and allied ground units only. At UNC headquarters in Tokyo, the estimate was that enemy forces suffered between 75,000 and 80,000 killed and wounded, 50,000 of these in the Seoul sector. Other estimates listed 71,712 enemy casualties on the I Corps front and 8,009 in the IX Corps sector. Although none of the estimates was certifiable, enemy losses were unquestionably huge.）

5月初，中共军队将其部队转移到朝鲜中部并于5月16日发动了针对第10军的攻势。在随后发生的联合国军称之为“昭阳江之战”的战斗中，联合国军使用弹药量的限额在朝鲜的作战中第一次被提高，炮兵部队则创造了发射速率的记录。例如，在5月17日，第2步兵师的第38野战炮兵营在12小时内用105mm榴弹炮发射了11，600发炮弹。当战斗在5月16日打响时，第10军可动用的炮兵力量如下：

4个中型炮兵营（美军）

7个轻型炮兵营（美军）（其中有一个自行火炮营）

1个155mm自行火炮连（美军）

1个8英寸（203mm）榴弹炮暂编连（美军）

2个轻型炮兵营（南朝鲜军）[3]

在战斗进行过程中，第10军接收到额外的炮兵，包括另一个8英寸榴弹炮连，使炮兵营的总数达到约20个。第10军将其炮兵沿40英里的正面展开在纵深30英里处，在至关紧要的六天内中共军队的攻势遭到顿挫并最终被粉碎，在这六天内第10军所属炮兵发射的弹药量如下：

日期 发射次数 吨数

5月16日，17,113发，504.71吨

5月17日，38,885发，1088.46吨

5月18日，41,357发，1187.45吨

5月19日，47,184发，1357.42吨

5月20日，50,102发，1377.53吨

5月21日，47,188发，1287.55吨

总计 241,829发，6803.124吨

在这6天内，B—26和B—29轰炸机也通过执行夜间轰炸任务支援了第10军。它们在雷达指挥下作战，每晚向中共军队的预备队和可能的集结地域投下约200吨炸弹[5]。中共军队因联合国军的炮击和轰炸而遭受的损失极为惨重，他们的部队经常陷入剧烈的混乱状态。尤其在夜间更为严重，尽管中共军队有夜战的传统，他们要收拢和重整部队仍然非常困难。

下面这个事例说明中共军队当时遭遇到了什么情况。5月19日，中国人俘虏了两名美军士兵，并把他们带到一个准备参与进攻的营的营部。5月20日晚，该营正在编队准备向南进攻时，遭受了猛烈的轰炸。可怕的爆炸使该营伤亡惨重，它的残余部队无秩序地向北溃逃。在混乱中，其中一名美军士兵趁机逃脱，一路潜行返回了美军的队伍。第9步兵团派出了一支巡逻队，试图查找另一名美军士兵。巡逻队发现他已经死了，而同一区域内还有大约300具全副武装的中共士兵的尸体[6]。中共军队通常会竭尽全力从战场上抢救武器装备，这些武器的出现是反映联合国军火力打击下中共部队组织瓦解程度的另一迹象。

当中共军队的指挥部认识到联合国军火力的破坏效果时，它立即采取措施去应对联合国军司令部所贯彻的“消耗战”。其中一个主要步骤是缩减联合国军火炮射程内的部队数量。通过对弹片的分析和对声光的研究，中共军队迅速确定了联合国军前线配置的火炮种类，从而判断出它们的位置。中共军队遵循“兵力配置前轻后重，火力配置前重后轻”[7]的原则，将较少的士兵部署在第一线，将主力部署在第二线和翼侧，准备发起反击。中共军队的指挥部随后指示：大批部队不应猬集于一点，不应再进行与阵地共存亡的防御。中共军队的目标是“在杀伤更多敌人的同时减少伤亡，赢得必需的时间”[8]。

在1951年上半年，中共军队应用兵力配置“前轻后重”原则时，美第8集团军称之为“一前二后”的防御阵形[9]。在部署兵力时，前沿的一个军将一个师配置在前线，以另两个师作为预备队。一个集团军将一个军配置在前线，以另两个军作为预备队。在前线的团依然担负修筑工事及顽强抵抗推进中的联合国军的任务，但此时占据地形已是次要的。中共军队的目的是制造联合国军攻势中的弱点，然后通过以纵深预备队发动反击的方式利用这些弱点。

1951年6月之后

1951年6月后，战线大致沿38 线展开，中共军队开始在主抵抗线上采用一种阵地防御。为了抵挡联合国军密集的空中和炮火轰击，中共军队以窄正面大纵深的方式部署部队，并开始建立精心设计的野战筑城体系，该体系包含伸出的前哨和对组织环形防御起关键作用的地形特征。第一防御阵地通常设置在正斜面上，人员掩蔽部则构筑在反斜面上。在前沿的堑壕中，每隔数英尺就在壕底挖一个可容纳单兵的藏兵洞。在壕壁则挖有供贮存手榴弹用的隐窝。地道和交错壕连接着正斜面防御阵地和人员掩蔽部。贮藏弹药的地方也通过堑壕与防御阵地相连。所有的阵地都是这样构筑的：在保持良好射界的同时，提供对敌方的高射角火力的防护。山顶上的防御阵地的顶部由可达15英尺厚的层层交叠的原木和泥土封盖。中共军队曾用过3到12层原木，层数的多少取决于获取原木的难易[10]。

除了靠工事掩护以外，中共军队也利用地形、天然植被、黑暗、恶劣天气及烟雾掩护它的活动。在前沿，行军在夜间进行，士兵相互间隔3至5步，以一路纵队行进。中共军队使用了辅助公路和拖车，而且其行军纪律非常严格。中国人只在夜间或恶劣天气下发动进攻，除非取得重大胜利的机会明显超过昼间行动中要付出的伤亡代价。一旦中共军队确定要占领的目标，它就会得在足够早的时候发动夜间攻击，以便战斗在午夜前结束。当夜的其余时间将被用来挖工事及组织防御阵地。中共军队迟滞或阻止联合国军前进的攻击开始得相当早，使得交战在黎明前就可能结束。中共军队在夜幕的掩护下进行预定的撤退，而且很少使用迫击炮或火炮实施火力支援。据中国战俘交待，这么做是因为中共士兵一旦开炮，他们就会立即成为联合国军炮兵的首选目标[11]。

伪装是中共军队对付联合国军炮兵的另一项防御措施。中共军队的指挥官极为注意对阵地的初步伪装，并且教导他们的部队最大限度的利用自然伪装和隐蔽。中共部队挖散兵坑时非常小心，他们不仅利用天然植被掩盖洞口，而且为避免引起注意分散四周的泥土。中共部队在散兵坑外休息时，将分散在树木或其他天然遮蔽下，彼此间至少保持10英尺的间隔。一旦一架飞机飞近，为避免因活动暴露阵地位置，这些士兵会就地纹丝不动。这种伪装措施经常使中共部队在行军中或穿越开阔地时免于被发现。中共士兵头戴的军帽上有线圈，可在上面捆系天然植物，这也有助于他们与周围环境混为一体。中共军队也小心地伪装迫击炮、火炮和接近前线的所有车辆。尽管迫击炮发射阵地通常设置在空旷的地方，中共军队的迫击炮组发射5至10发炮弹后，仍会把迫击炮转移至距发射阵地数十码的伪装过的洞中，然后将其隐蔽在散兵坑内。为了提高伪装的效果，中国人用手头上的材料制造了许多圈套。他们把稻草塞进破衣服里做成逼真的假步兵，并且用原木做成假炮筒，用铁板做成假防盾，用木板做成假拖车，用稻草做成假车轮，这样就建造了假炮兵阵地[12]。尽管这些材料相当简陋，他们的圈套却真地吸引了联合国军的大量炮击。中共军队的伪装措施是如此的有效，据美第9军情报处长1951年9月的报告， 它们是中共军队面对联合国军持续的航空侦察和猛烈炮击仍能成功生存的主要原因[13]。

总结

中共军队通过三条途径减少了联合国军火力造成的伤亡：

●中共军队缩减了进攻行动的规模。最初，中共军队计划并在最初的作战中致力于歼灭联合国军师级规模的部队。防御强大的联合国军炮兵的需求迫使中共军队将目标改为歼灭连、营级别的部队。对于中共军队，事情变得很明显，开展大规模行动所必需的人员、物资的集结会给联合国军的空军和炮兵提供很多不错的靶子。

●中共军队分散了部队和补给，并尽可能地将他们保护在地面以下。

●中共军队通过对掩护和隐蔽的有效利用，使尽浑身解数去抵消联合国军搜索目标的努力。通过采用这些防御措施，火力显然比联合国军差很多的中共军队在战场上保持了充足的战斗力，使得中国政府能够在朝鲜实现某些战略目标。如果用实现政治——军事目标来定义成功的话，那么中国共产主义者对联合国军炮兵的防御措施是成功的。

（完）

[1]. U.S. Army, I Corps, "The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, April 1951" (Korea, 1953), 35.

[2]. Ibid（同上）, 38.

[3]. Edward M. Almond, Conference on Battle Employment of

Artillery in Korea (Fort Sill, OK: Artillery Center, 11 February I952), 5.

[4]. U.S. Army, X Corps, Artillery, Battle of the Soyang River: An

Analysis of Artillery Support X Corps Sector (Korea, 29 May 1951)

[Inclosure 5].

[5]. Almond, Artillery Conference, chart 16.

[6]. Ibid., 7.

[7]. 蒋仲安（音译），《抗美援朝战争中运动防御作战的经验》，《军事历史》，1987年第4期

Jiang Zhongan, "Tan Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhenzhong Yundong Fangyu Zuozhan ti Jingyan" [A discussion of the experiences of mobile defense operations during the war to resist America and aid Korea], Junshi Lishi [Military history], No.4-1987:17.

[8]. Ibid.

[9]. U.S. Army, Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics" (Korea, December 1951), 76, hereafter cited as Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics."

[10]. Ibid., 91-92.

[11]. U.S. Army, IX Corps, G2 Section, "Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine" (Korea, September 1951), 28, here after cited as IX Corps, "Enemy Tactics."

[12]. Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics," 95-96.

[13]. IX Corps, "Enemy Tactics," 6.

TACTICAL RESPONSES TO CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY

CHAPTER 7

THE KOREAN WAR: CHINESE FORCES’ RESPONSE TO HEAVY BOMBARDMENT

by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

The Chinese armies sent to Korea during the Korean War consisted basically of light infantry divisions with no air, no armor, and little artillery support. The United Nations (UN) forces they faced enjoyed air supremacy over the front lines and an enormous superiority in artillery firepower. During the first half of 1951, the UN Command used its air assets and artillery to inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and forced the CCF to develop special defensive measures. First, offensive operations were reduced in scale. Second, the CCF attempted to reduce the number of lucrative targets and placed as much of the army underground as possible. These efforts were successful enough to allow the CCF to maintain the combat power needed to achieve an operational and strategic stalemate on the Korean peninsula.

April and May 1951

The devastating effect of artillery fire and aerial bombing on CCF maneuver units is illustrated by what happened during the CCF's April and May offensives in 1951. The April offensive against the U.S. I Corps north of Seoul pushed UN lines back to the northern outskirts of the city but then ground to a haft in the face of heavy casualties and disorganizaton caused by UN air and artillery attacks. Interdiction of CCF rear areas by UN bombers and long-range artillery caused the Chinese supply system to collapse and disrupted communications between units. As confusion increased, CCF commanders were forced to issue such generalized orders as "go as far south as possible." Reserve units passed through forward units without knowing the number of casualties already sustained or the state of confusion that existed.1 When the offensive ended after nine days, an estimated 71,712 Chinese and North Korean soldiers had been killed.2

Early in May, the CCF shifted its units to central Korea and, on 16 May, launched an offensive against X Corps. During the resulting battle, which UN forces called the Battle of the Soyang River, restrictions on the use of ammunition by UN artillery were lifted for the first time in Korean operations, and artillery units achieved record rates of fire. For example, during one 12-hour period on 17 May, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division fired 11,600 rounds from its 105-mm howitzers. When the battle opened on 16 May, the artillery available in X Corps consisted of the following:

4 medium battalions (U.S.)

7 light battalions (U.S.)(1 armored SP)

1 battery, 155-mm (SP) (U.S.)

1 provisional battery, 8-inch howitzer (U.S.)

2 light battalions (ROK) 3

While the battle was in progress, X Corps received additional artillery, including another battery of 8-inch howitzers, bringing the total number of battalions to almost twenty. The X Corps deployed this artillery to a depth of thirty miles along a forty-mile front, and during the six crucial days when the CCF offensive was blunted and finally broken, it fired the following amount of ammunition:

date Rounds Tons

16 May 17,113 504.71

17 May 38,885 1,088.46

18 May 41,357 1,187.45

19 May 47,184 1,357.42

20 May 50,102 1,377.53

21 May 47,188 1,287.55

Total 241,829 6,803.124

During these six days, B-26 and B-29 bombers on night-bombing missions also supported X Corps. Operating under radar control, they dropped as many as 200 tons of bombs a night on CCF reserves and suspected assembly areas.5 CCF casualties from this artillery fire and bombing were extremely heavy, and their units often fell into a state of great confusion. This was especially true at night when, despite the CCF's tradition of night fighting, they found it hard to collect troops and reorganize.

The following incident illustrates what was happening to the CCF at this time. On 19 May, the Chinese captured two U.S. soldiers and took them to the headquarters of a CCF battalion preparing to join the attack. On the night of 20 May, this battalion came under heavy bombing just as it was forming to attack south. Terrible explosions inflicted so many casualties that the surviving troops fled northward in disorder. Amid this confusion, one of the U.S. soldiers escaped and made his way back to the U.S. lines. A patrol from the 9th Infantry was sent out to try to locate the other American. The patrol found him dead, but in the same area, there were also approximately 300 dead fully armed CCF soldiers.6 Since the CCF always placed great stress on salvaging weapons from the battlefield, the presence of all these weapons was another indication of how CCF unit organization was breaking down under the impact of UN firepower.

When the CCF headquarters realized the destructive effect of UN firepower, it promptly took action to counter what the Chinese called the "inflict-casualties-war" being carried out by the UN Command. One major step was to reduce the number of troops deployed within the effective range of UN artillery. By means of shell fragment analysis and the study of sound and flash, the CCF quickly determined the type of UN artillery deployed across the front line from its units and then positioned them accordingly. Following what they called the principle of "with troops light to the front and heavy to the rear, with firepower heavy to the front and light to the rear,"7 the CCF placed a relatively small number of soldiers along the front line while the main body was positioned along a second line and on the flanks in preparation for counterattacks. The headquarters then directed that large numbers of troops should not concentrate in one place and that there should be no more defending of positions to the death. The CCF objective was "to limit casualties while still fighting to kill and wound more of the enemy and gain the time that was needed."8

During the first half of 1951, when the CCF was applying the principle of deploying troops "light to the front and heavy to the rear," the U.S. Eighth Army described it as a "one up, two back" defensive formation.9 In this disposition of forces, a forward corps had one division on the front line with two divisions in reserve. An army had one corps forward with two corps in reserve. Frontline regiments still had the mission of digging in and offering stiff resistance to advancing UN troops, but the holding of terrain was now of minor importance. The CCF objective was to create weaknesses in a UN offensive and then exploit them using counterattacks by its deep reserves.

After June 1951

After June 1951, with the front line roughly along the 38th Parallel, the CCF began to employ a position-type defense along a main line of resistance. In order to withstand intense UN air and artillery bombardment, the CCF deployed units in great depth along narrow fronts and erected an elaborate system of field fortifications with extended outposts and key terrain features organized for an all-around defense. Primary defensive positions were commonly placed on the forward slope, with personnel shelters on the reverse slope. The forward defensive trenches had shelter holes for individual soldiers dug into the bottom at intervals of several feet. Recesses for storing hand grenades were dug into the sides. Tunnels and alternate trenches connected the forward slope defensive positions and the personnel shelters. Ammunition storage spaces were also connected with the defensive positions by trenches. All positions were constructed to provide cover from high-angle fire while still maintaining good fields of fire. The fortifications on hilltops were covered with alternate layers of logs and dirt to a depth of up to fifteen feet. From three to twelve layers of logs were used, depending on their availability.10

In addition to digging in to provide cover, the CCF also used the terrain, natural vegetation, darkness, unfavorable weather conditions, and smoke to cover its movements. In forward areas, marches took place at night, with the men walking in single file three to five paces apart. Secondary roads and trails were used, and march discipline was very strict. The Chinese launched attacks only at night or during poor weather, unless the opportunity for a major success clearly outweighed the extra casualties to be taken in a daytime operation. If an objective was to be held, the attack began early enough in the evening so that the battle would be over by midnight. The rest of the night could then be spent digging in and organizing a defensive position. Attacks designed to delay or halt UN advances began early enough to allow an end to the engagement by daybreak. Planned withdrawals took place under cover of darkness and only rarely were supported by mortar or artillery fire. According to Chinese prisoners of war, this was done because, if CCF soldiers opened fire, they immediately became primary targets for UN artillery.11

Camouflage was another CCF defense against UN artillery. Unit commanders paid great attention to the initial camouflaging of their positions and instructed their troops to always take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Troops dug foxholes very carefully and not only concealed the hole with natural vegetation but also scattered the dirt around to avoid attracting attention. When resting outside of foxholes, the troops would scatter about under trees or other natural cover, always keeping a distance of at least ten feet between them. If an aircraft approached, the men would freeze in place in order not to disclose their position by movement. This kind of camouflage discipline often saved CCF units from detection while they were on the march or crossing open terrain. The uniform caps worn by CCF soldiers had loops on them for attaching natural vegetation, and this helped them blend in with their surroundings. The CCF also was careful to camouflage mortars, artillery pieces, and all vehicles near the front. Although mortar firing positions were almost always in cleared areas, after firing five to ten rounds, crews would place the mortar in a camouflaged hole some ten yards from the firing position and then take shelter in individual foxholes. To heighten the effect of camouflage, the Chinese made decoys using materials found at hand. They stuffed straw into discarded clothing to create realistic dummy riflemen and also constructed dummy artillery positions using logs for barrels, steel plates for shields, boards for trails, and straw for wheels.12 Although made with simple material, these decoys were realistic enough to attract a significant amount of UN fire. So effective were CCF camouflage efforts that, according to a report written by the U.S. IX Corps G2 in September 1951, they were a major reason for the CCFs ability to survive in the face of constant aerial surveillance and fierce bombardment by UN forces.13

Conclusion

The Communist Chinese Forces reduced casualties from UN firepower in three ways:

• The CCF reduced the scale of offensive operations. Initially, the CCF had planned and initiated operations intended to destroy UN division-sized units. The need to defend against massive UN artillery, however, forced the CCF to change its focus to planning operations designed to destroy company and battalion-sized units. It became obvious to the CCF very soon that the concentrations of men and materiel required for large-scale operations created too many good targets for UN air and artillery forces.

• The CCF dispersed troops and supplies and protected them underground as much as possible.

• The CCF exerted every effort to counter UN target acquisition efforts through the effective use of cover and concealment. By using these defensive measures, the CCF, a force whose firepower was decidedly inferior to that of the UN Command, maintained enough combat power in the field to allow the Chinese government to achieve certain strategic objectives in Korea. If success is defined by achieving political-military objectives, Communist Chinese defensive measures against UN artillery were successful.

楼主辛苦了，翻译的好资料，为志愿军战士们骄傲下，是他们，用自己的血肉打出了这个国家的地位和荣耀，我们不一定能够说赢了朝鲜战争，但是以当时的国力对比，能够逼退美国人，已经是非常非常了不起的事情了。

的另外一篇“Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign ”。

的工作热情和效率往往超过拿官薪的科班啊！

反面说明了美军的火力使用糟糕，如果有利的装备控制条件下居然打成这样。要换一下不知道美军会成啥样子。美军也就能打打伊拉克这样的沙漠平川。