主题：【整理】对印度北方陆军司令：乔希中将 采访实录 -- 海木耳

China Realised We’re Not Budging, Had To Relent: Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi

“中国意识到我们没有退让，不得不缓和”

---- 北方陆军司令：乔希中将 采访实录

Nitin A.Gokhale: 尼丁·高卡勒；StratNews Global 总编辑

Nitin: Hello and welcome, I am Nitin Gokhale and I am speaking to you from the capital of union territory of Ladakh and I am privileged to have with me northern army commander lieutenant general YK Joshi who’s been at the forefront of India’s response to the Chinese aggression in the eastern Ladakh sector of the LAC for the past almost nine months the disengagement process which began last Wednesday is underway right now and of course we are going to speak to general Joshi about what happened in these past nine months and how the future roadmap looks when India and China start talking again.

Joshi, thank you very much for your time and welcome to this program.

Nitin: 大家好。我是尼丁·高卡勒（Nitin Gokhale），现在拉达克Ladakh首府为您报道。我很荣幸采访北方陆军司令YK·乔希中将（Lt Gen Joshi），过去近9个月以来，他一直战斗在拉达克东部实控线抵御中国侵略的最前沿。上周三开始的脱离接触进程目前正在进行中，我们将与乔希将军谈谈过去9个月中发生的事情，以及未来印中对峙发展的路线图。乔希，非常感谢你接受我们的采访。

Lt Gen Joshi: Thank you all my pleasure talking to you anything.

Lt Gen Joshi: 谢谢你们，我也很荣幸回答你的任何问题。

Nitin: You know we are speaking almost a week after the disengagement was announced or started at Pangong Tso lake both on the north and the south bank, How is it progressing?

Nitin: 从宣布或启动班公湖南北两岸脱离，快一周了，你知道现在进展如何？

以下翻译略，【】里是对方插嘴的，（）里是口误大概，{}是我简单备注。太多了，有兴趣的话，慢慢看吧。他们讲着极为流利的印度英语，语法，用词遣句很多不规范，但是口语吧，可以理解。真的好难听懂，听了好多遍还是听不清楚，尤其是声音互相重叠的时候。不过我尽力了，尽量原汁原味记录了他们说的每一个词。

Lt Gen Joshi: So the disengagement process started on the 10th of February, and it is progressing very well it is progressing very very smoothly to say the least. It was decided that we’ll have a disengagement in four steps you know and after graduating from one step to the other we were to verify each step on the ground we are continuously monitoring and only once both the armies are satisfied with each other that the step one has been you know done to the satisfaction of each other then we’ll go to the next step so since it has started continuously we are monitoring we have our UAVS in the air we’re getting satellite imagery we have vantage points where we are cameras placed and we’re continuously monitoring the day starts every day the distinguishing process with a flag meeting where the entire days activities are discussed has already been decided but again we refreshed that today this is the activity that we’re going to do and towards the end of the day both sides send a hotline to each other confirming that the activities have been done and in case there is an issue with each other then we again have a flag meeting discuss it. The issues are resolved and then we go to the next activity.

Nitin: It is on the same day the flag meeting or the next day?

Lt Gen Joshi: On the same day. On the same day.

Nitin: And when you say “Hotline”, these are written communication?

Lt Gen Joshi: No, this is on the phone.

Nitin: On the phone.

Lt Gen Joshi: On the phone communication opening.

Nitin: So, these four steps that you mentioned was basically to just take the step then verify again, Uh, re-verify and then start the next.

Lt Gen Joshi: Absolutely, absolutely. And step one was you know the disengagement of the armored mech which was you know in the most close proximity and that has happened very very smoothly. This step two and three were the disengagement on the north and south bank, and step four is the final disagreement that will happen on the Rezang La and Rechin La complex.

Nitin: O.K

Lt Gen Joshi: So that is a manner it was decided and the important thing is that it has been decided that once this phase of disengagement is over within 48 hours, we will be having another the tenth corps commanders flag meeting which we will sort of discuss the resolution of the other friction areas.

Nitin: Right, but even in the first phase as we see it you know the north and south bank the four steps that you described, this is all written down basically the entire agreement that is for the first time in recent years perhaps is written down, right?

Lt Gen Joshi: Yes. Absolutely. It was written down and agreed by both sides and then you know once you’re ratified by the higher headquarters [right] then the process started.

Nitin: Okay. So in this almost six, seven days that the process is on, how has this been done like you said, you know, there is also one point that I had seen in the agreement about restoring landforms. [Correct]. What does that mean?

Lt Gen Joshi: So, you know, some areas on the north bank the PLA occupied right up to finger four and from finger four to eight, they had made a lot of infrastructure dugouts, you know, tents had come up, sangars had come up in large number of areas, and so the entire landform you would have seen on satellite imagery some places they had made those maps as well, you know, so as for the agreement the entire landform in this entire area from finger four to finger eight will be restored back to April 2020.

Nitin: Oh, that’s the very important point because that’s where I think the main dispute was. So the other issue when it comes up about finger four finger eight area where they are occupied in May 2020, is that and there is also this agreement if I if you can correct me if I’m wrong that now they will be east of finger eight, and we will be our troops will be at finger three the post that is there.

Lt Gen Joshi: Absolutely.

Nitin: Right, but I know neither side will patrol in those in between areas.

Lt Gen Joshi: Absolutely.

Nitin: So, some people have said critics , have said that we have lost the right to go to finger eight which you used to go, what do you have to say to that?

Lt Gen Joshi: This is a misrepresentation or misinterpretation of the agreement. You know, we have to look at in this manner, that our claim line is still finger eight. [Right]

The PLA is going back behind finger eight. They behind our claim line. They are restoring the entire landform from finger four to finger eight back to April 2020. They will not carry out any activity to our side of finger eight that is our claimed areas. [correct]. It is a huge success.

Nitin: That’s right. {以下3句声音重叠，不太清楚}

Lt Gen Joshi: How are we ceding?

Nitin: They came up to the finger four, right? earlier.

Lt Gen Joshi: They should (not) go up to finger four.

Nitin: They claimed also they remain at finger four.

Lt Gen Joshi: They claimed they remain at finger four, but I mean like I said we have to see it in this manner [Yeah] that he is not doing any activity military or otherwise in the areas claimed by us. [Exactly]. It is a huge success.

Nitin: It is. It is. In fact, that was as I think a former diplomat said, Indian diplomat, that this is the best one could have expected after all what they have done [Absolutely] but let’s move to south bank now. You know, your action on 29th 30th August, Would you say when you look back, was it that action that actually gave us an equal footing in the negotiations.

Lt Gen Joshi: Absolutely. Absolutely. That was a, you know, action which was done on the 29th and 30th which finally turned the tables on the PLA and got him back to the negotiating table. You know, prior to August 20th, August 29,30th we already had five corps-level flag meetings [Right] We were on the back foot, you know, he had occupied areas on the north bank he was in a dominating locations but past 29,30th of August when we occupied the Rezang La, Rechin La complex the most dominating features, you know, looking onto his Moldo garrison and cross on the other side, we occupied the south bank we occupied even, you know, higher heights over the finger four, you know, dominating all the locations that the PLA occupied, he was brought back to the negotiating table.

Nitin: And, you surprised him quite a bit.

Lt Gen Joshi: We were, you know, well planned well thought out and executed, you know, achieving total surprise [exactly] on the PLA, they never expected that, you know, we would do this kind of action, and the credit goes to the soldier on the ground, the junior leaders, you know, who have planned, rehearsed, you know, well, we may say that since June 15 when Galwan happened, you know, this happened in August, you know, but this is the time, you know, you have to, you aware of that how it happens we have to build up our forces, we have to stage them forward without restricting situation we had to achieve surprise so we did training we did our planning and finally, you know, the right moment we executed this.

Nitin: And you put tanks to Rezang La and Rechin La.

Lt Gen Joshi: You know, which can which was unthinkable actually [Exactly] a couple of months ago.

Nitin: Yeah and it was never done before I mean that’s the holy issue so talking continuing to talk about south bank, see, so that advantage you got and you saw noticed a change of attitude in the Chinese [absolutely] approach [absolutely] so it still took three four more rounds [Correct] …

Lt Gen Joshi: He was still looking for a face saver [Exactly] and, you know, finally understood that, you know, we were looking at status quo ante of April 2020 [That’s right] and we’re not going to budge [Correct] so I think he realized that and while in the next three flag meetings until the ninth corps-level flag meeting he continued to look for a face saver and then he relented.

Nitin: So the breakthrough came in the final ninth round.

Lt Gen Joshi: Ninth absolutely. [Okay and it was the longest…] Of course a lot of backchannels have been happening. The defense minister met and spoke, the foreign minister met and spoke, the NSAs have been speaking [Yes] So it was a whole of a nation approach [of course] and finally of course in the ninth corps-level flag meeting we had this certain issue.

Nitin: Also I think they were very surprised that we had a MEA’s representative in the delegation?

Lt Gen Joshi: Yeah so it was initially agreed that both sides will have a rep so the Chinese had also had the rep of the ocean and boundary affairs that have had come, you know, handles this and I mean has been there which is a huge advantage actually.

Nitin: Exactly. As you mentioned whole level of government approach [absolutely] so there’s no differences that are seen or are perceived. On the south bank before I move on to the other one, there is this, you know, a lot of writings that are happening by some people some commentators that should we have had not sort of vacated south bank having gained the advantage.

Lt Gen Joshi: Were you talking about Rezang La, Rechin La?

Nitin: Rezang La, Rechin La.

Lt Gen Joshi: Yeah, Rezang La, Rechin La is a dominating feature on the Kailash range we have occupied it but it was done with a purpose. [Right] You know, it was done with a purpose to push the negotiations to disengagement and that is what happened, you know, so it is it is not that, you know, it is (not) an advantage in perpetuity [Correct]. Now we can’t, you know, equate the occupation of Rezang La, Rechin La and try to resolve the entire boundary issue with this. [You can’t be greedy] So, it was the purpose that has been done and disengagement is happening [Yes], you know, which we’re looking at in the areas where we were disadvantaged in the north bank and we need to restore the status quo ante.

Nitin: Correct. That was the first purpose. [Absolutely]. It’s not about resolving the LAC, [Absolutely] but like there’s in this context itself there’s the apprehension what if they come and occupy again after this.

Lt Gen Joshi: So, you know, the disengagement was premised on the fact that you know we will not occupy again obviously [right] and having done this you know we have sort of indicated our intent very clearly to the PLA that we will not allow a unilateral change [Right] of the status quo on the LAC and the message has been sort of understood well by them and in the 9th corps commander flag meeting there has been agreement that these areas will not be reoccupied.

Nitin: Right, and any case you will keep a vigil I am sure.

Lt Gen Joshi: Absolutely. Yeah, so we have now the force levels adequately available, plans are in place, and ISR is in place [Correct] and I am sure he will not do all that.

Nitin: Because, well, let’s move to the…

Lt Gen Joshi: Typically like, you know, ?????? {没听清楚}

Nitin: That is true and I think now we know because your force levels have really enhanced since…

Lt Gen Joshi: 2020. 2010 when you came to Ladakh when I was a brigade commander, [Yeah] there were only two battalions, you know, looking after the entire area [Absolutely] now we have over 90,000 troops in eastern Ladakh.

Nitin: And you have a what one division worthy of armor if I am not mistaken.

Lt Gen Joshi: Quite a lot.

Nitin: Yeah. So moving on. Now the other friction points which are these are the friction points.

Lt Gen Joshi: To the other friction points are, you know, we start with Depsang [Right] then we have in these patrolling point PP15, PP17 Alpha and then of course we have the CNN junction {？？？} that is Demchok {China: Parigas} area [Right] and like I said that once we agree to disengagement it was also agreed that the day disengagement happens finishes within 48 hours we will have another corps commander level meeting [Correct] and then we will discuss all the other areas you know and resolve them.

Nitin: Exactly. So the Depsang has been an old issue for some time. What is the issue there?

Lt Gen Joshi: You see. The Depsang, one has to understand it is not related to the present imbroglio that is because of which we launched snow leopard this is a legacy issue [Right] and as I mentioned earlier 2010 when I was brigade commander here this was a flashpoint then as well [Correct] and the other thing you have to understand is this is the area where the areas of different perception is the largest [Okay] and like I said it predates the present situation and so since it is the largest area, you know, our patrols go, so they want to give us a face-off and when their patrols come, we give them a face-off so that is what is the situation prevailing there now. The situation is not volatile [Right] and it has to be resolved at some level and I am sure it will get resolved.

Nitin: But what is the connection there of the 1959 claim line so-called 1959 claim line?

Lt Gen Joshi: You see 1959 claim line we don’t recognize. This was generally proposed by Zhou Enlai in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and our stand has always been that we don’t do not recognize the 1959 7th November 1959 claim line. So they have been retarding that and they want to come to that claim line which we have not been permitting since we don’t recognize that.

Nitin: And in that area their claim line comes to put … mistaken.

Lt Gen Joshi: You know, the 1959 claim line was on a very small scale map [Right] so it is very difficult to exactly sort of clarify that where it comes or does not come and all that.

Nitin: It was not a very serious thing that India wanted anyway discussed like you mentioned. You can never recognize it.

Lt Gen Joshi: Correct. Absolutely.