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Non-economic lending

Xinhua’s article on Monday was a little more circumspect:

China’s State Council, the Cabinet, ordered local governments on Sunday to better manage investment agencies amid concern that their borrowings, estimated at hundreds of billions of yuan, could cause problems for Chinese banks. It also directed banks to control lending to these agencies by targeting loans at specific projects and monitoring how the credit is used.

Chinese banks have escaped the mortgage-related turmoil that hit Western financial institutions and triggered the global economic downturn, but analysts warn that a lending boom driven by government stimulus spending could leave lenders with a mountain of bad loans.

…The State Council statement said some banks and financial organs had poor risk awareness while investment agencies lacked adequate credit management. Local governments, it said, had also broken rules. They are not allowed to use state-owned assets or government revenue to offer guarantees, directly or indirectly, for the investment agencies.

These investment agencies or debt vehicles, which seem to account for a large portion of the recent fiscal and credit expansion, have become notorious for the quality of their investing, but since these debt vehicles were created precisely to generate the level, if not the type, of growth that Beijing required, it is not clear how easy it will be to enforce the new ban. It is going to be hard to generate rapid growth without leaving on the credit spigot. This kind of thing is one of the expected consequences of financial repression.

More importantly, China’s financial repression is also at the heart of the imbalance in the Chinese economy. By transferring large amounts of wealth from the household sector to net borrowers (perhaps as much as 5-10% of GDP annually, as I explain in an earlier entry), it creates the large growth differential between national GDP and household income that is at the root of China’s very high savings and very low consumption levels.

I should add that if much of this investment is non-economic, as I believe it is, this will exacerbate even further the differential. Why? Because the total economic cost of the investment (which must include the real debt forgiveness implied by excessively low interest rates), and which will be borne over the future as the cost are amortized in the form of debt repayment, exceeds the total economic value of the investment (which must include externalities), which will accrue upfront. This means that we get more investment-driven growth today and less consumption-driven growth tomorrow.

China is faced with a difficult policy choice. It can maintain an undervalued exchange rate, it can run the risk of inflation, or it can increase the domestic costs of financial repression. How Beijing balances these separate forces will determine the pace and form of its necessary rebalancing.

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